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Abstract

The class of problems dealt by grid computing are those
which involve tremendous computations and can be broken
down into independent tasks. A general grid computing environment includes a supervisor and a group of participants
who allow the idle cycles of their processors to be used for
the computations. The participants are totally ignorant of
each other and after completing their tasks report back the
results to the supervisor.
Past few years have seen a tremendous growth in grid
computing with its effect being felt in the biotechnology industry, entertainment industry, financial industry, etc. The
success of the projects like SETI@home [2], IBM smallpox research [3], GIMPS [4] has made the potential of grid
computing visible.
For instance, IBM’s smallpox research [3] uses grid
computing to find potential drugs to counter the smallpox
virus. Its main task is to screen hundreds of thousands of
molecules, a task that can take years even with supercomputers. By downloading and running the software, participants can add their CPUs to the global grid. Every time
their computers are idle, the computing resources can be
contributed to the grid, accelerating the screening process
while dramatically reducing the cost of the project. The
result is that rather than spending years, it will be possible to screen hundreds of millions of molecules in just
months. Another highly-profiled grid computing project is
SETI@home [2], which is a scientific experiment that uses
Internet-connected computers in the Search for Extraterrestrial Intelligence (SETI). SETI@home has more than 4.5
million users contributing their computers’ unused processing power, to form a 15 Teraflops grid, faster than IBM’s
most powerful supercomputer ASCI White (12 Teraflops).
Also the cost of the SETI grid is only 500K dollars whereas
ASCI White costs 110 million dollars [2].
However the untrusted environments in which the computations are performed tend to cast suspicion on the veracity of the results returned by the participants. The participant may not have performed the necessary computations
but claims to have done so. This cheating behavior, if un-

Grid computing is a type of distributed computing that has shown promising applications in many fields.
A great concern in grid computing is the cheating problem described in the following: a participant is given
D = {x1 , . . . , xn }, it needs to compute f (x) for all
x ∈ D and return the results of interest to the supervisor. How does the supervisor efficiently ensure that the participant has computed f (x) for all the inputs in D, rather
than a subset of it? If participants get paid for conducting the task, there are incentives for cheating. In this
paper, we propose a novel scheme to achieve the uncheatable grid computing. Our scheme uses a sampling technique and the Merkle-tree based commitment technique
to achieve efficient and viable uncheatable grid computing.

1. Introduction
The increasing complexity of computations, better processing power of the personal computers and the ever increasing reach and speed of the Internet have laid down
the path for grid computing. Computational grid is a novel,
evolving infrastructure that provides unified, coordinated
access to computing resources such as processor cycles,
storage, etc. Wide variety of systems, from small workstations to supercomputers can be linked to a grid to form a
powerful virtual computer. All the complexities involved in
managing resources of a grid are hidden from the clients,
providing a seamless access to computing resources. As a
great advancement towards cost reduction, computational
grids can be used as a replacement for supercomputers that
are presently used in many computationally intensive scientific problems [1, 7].
∗
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detected, may render the results useless. Project managers
from SETI@home have reportedly uncovered attempts by
some users “to forge the amount of time they have donated
in order to move up on the Web listings of top contributors” [5]. Yet SETI participants are volunteers who do not
get paid for the cycles they contribute. When participants
are paid for their contribution, they have strong incentives
to cheat for maximizing their gain.
Therefore, we need methods to detect the cheating behaviors in grid computing. We formulate the problem of
uncheatable grid computing in the following:

pervisor sends to the participant some pre-computed results,
without disclosing the corresponding inputs. The participant must find out those secret inputs. Golle and Mironov
have shown that by selecting the secret inputs in proper
ways, the chance for a participant to cheat successfully is
slim. This scheme is generally referred to as the ringer
scheme. The ringer scheme assumes that finding the secret
inputs from the pre-computed results is no easier than using the brute-force approach to try all the inputs. Therefore
the function f must have the one-way property, i.e., it is
difficult to find x from f (x). The ringer scheme is thus restricted to computations that have such a one-way property
and it cannot be applied to generic computations.
Szada, Lawson, and Owen extend the ringer scheme to
deal with other general classes of computations, including
optimization and Monte Carlo simulations [10]. They propose effective ways to choose ringers for those computations. It is still unknown whether the schemes proposed
in [10] can be extended further to generic computations.

Problem 1 (Uncheatable Grid Computing) A participant is
assigned a task consisting of computing f (x) for all the inputs x ∈ D = {x1 , . . . , xn }, where n = |D|; the participant needs to return the results of interest to the supervisor. A dishonest participant might compute f (x) for only
x ∈ D′ , where D′ is a subset of D, but claims to have
computed f for all the inputs. How does the supervisor efficiently detect whether the participant is telling a truth or a
lie?

2. Problem Definition

A straightforward solution is to double-check every result. The supervisor can assign the same task to more
than one participant and compare their results. This simple scheme leads to the wastage of processor cycles that are
precious resources in grid computing. Moreover, it introduces O(n) communication cost for each participant. Note
that in grid computing, the supervisor only needs the participant to return the results of interest, which is usually a
very small number compared to n. Therefore O(n) overhead is substantial.
An improved solution is to use sampling techniques. The
supervisor randomly selects a small number of inputs from
D (we call these randomly selected inputs samples or sample inputs); it only double-checks the results of these sample inputs. If the dishonest participant computes only one
half of the inputs, the probability that it can successfully
cheat the supervisor is one out of 2m , where m is the number of samples. If we make m large enough, e.g. m = 50,
the cheating is almost impossible. This solution has a very
small computational overhead (O(m)), because m ≪ n.
However, this scheme still suffers from the O(n) communication cost because it requires the participant to send all
the results back to the supervisor, including those that are
of no interest to the supervisor. To improve this situation,
we have developed a Commitment-Based Sampling (CBS)
scheme. Our scheme reduces the communication overhead
to O(m log n). Because n is usually large (e.g., n = 240 ),
this result is a substantial improvement.

2.1. Model of Grid Computing
We consider a grid computing in which untrusted participants are taking part. The computation is organized by a
supervisor. Formally, such computations are defined in our
model by the following elements:
• A function f : X 7→ T defined on a finite domain
X. The goal of the computation is to evaluate f on all
x ∈ X. For the purpose of distributing the computation, the supervisor partition X into subsets. The evaluation of f on subset Xi is assigned to participant i.
• A screener S. The screener is a program that takes as
input a pair of the form (x; f (x)) for x ∈ X, and returns a string s = S(x; f (x)). S is intended to screen
for “valuable” outputs of f that are reported to the supervisor by means of the string s. We assume that the
run-time of S is of negligible cost compared to the
evaluation of f .

2.2. Models of Cheating
A participant can choose to cheat for a variety of reasons. We categorize the cheating using the following two
models. We assume that the participant is given a domain
D ⊂ X, and its task is to compute f (x) for all x ∈ D.
From now on, we use D as the domain of f for the participant.

1.1. Related Work

• Semi-Honest Cheating Model: In this model, the cheating participant follows the supervisor’s computations
with one exception: for x ∈ Ď ⊂ D, the participant

To defeat cheating in grid computing, Golle and Mironov
proposed a ringer scheme [8]. In the ringer scheme, the su-
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uses fˇ(x) as the result of f (x). Function fˇ is usually
much less expensive than function f ; for instance, fˇ
can be a random guess. The goal of the cheating participant in this model is to reduce the amount of computations, such that it can maximize its gain by “performing” more tasks during the same period of time.

R: Φ(R) = hash(Φ(E)||Φ(F ))
C: Φ(C) = hash(Φ(A)||Φ(B))

E: Φ(E) = hash(Φ(C)||Φ(D))
C

• Malicious Cheating Model: In this model, the behavior of the participant can be arbitrary. For example, a
malicious participant might have calculated function
f on all x ∈ D, but when it computes the screener
function S, instead of computing S(x; f (x)), it might
compute S(x; z), where z is random number. In other
words, the participant intentionally returns wrong results to the supervisor, for the purpose of disrupting
the computations.

L1

F

D
B

A

L2

L3

L4

Selected
Sample x3

···

···

Ln

Φ(Li ) = f (xi ), for i = 1 . . . n

Figure 1. CBS Scheme: the Merkle Tree and
the Verification

To maximize their gains, rational cheaters tend to use
minimal cost to falsify the contributions they have never
made. Their behaviors fall into the semi-honest cheating
model. Therefore, in this paper, we focus on the semi-honest
cheating model.

the supervisor side is O(264 ), which is about 16 million terabytes. Very few networks can handle such a heavy network
load.
Is it possible not to require each participant to send all
the outputs? Or is it possible just to ask the participant to
send the results for those sample inputs? The solution is
non-trivial because we have to prevent the participant from
computing the results for the sample inputs after it learns
which inputs are samples. For example, if xk is selected
as a sample, the supervisor needs f (xk ) from the participant to check whether the participant has correctly calculated f (xk ). However, without a proper security measure,
the participant, who has not computed f (xk ), can always
compute it after learning xk is a sample. This defeats the
purpose of sampling.
One way to solve the above problem is to use commitment. Before the participant knows that xk is a sample, it
needs to send the commitment for f (xk ) to the supervisor.
Once the participant commits, it cannot change f (xk ) without being caught. The supervisor then tells xk to the participant, which has to reply with the original value of f (xk )
that was committed. Since any input has equal probability
to become a sample, this means the participant has to commit all the results for those n inputs; how can it be done efficiently? Obviously the participant cannot afford to send the
commitment for each single input, because the O(n) communication cost makes it no better than the naive sampling
scheme. The participant cannot hash all these n results together to form one single commitment either; although this
method achieves the commitment for all results, it makes
verifying a single result difficult because to do that, the supervisor needs to know all the other n − 1 results.
In summary, we need a commitment scheme that (1) allows all the n results to be committed efficiently, and (2) allows the verification of each single result to be performed
efficiently. We use the Merkle Tree [9] to achieve these
goals.

2.3. Definition of Uncheatable Grid Computing
Assume that a participant is assigned a task that consists
of computing f (x) for all x ∈ D, where D = {x1 , . . . , xn }.
If a participant computes the function f only on x ∈ D′ ,
where D′ ⊆ D, we define the honesty ratio r as the value
′
|
of |D
|D| . When the participant is fully honest, the honesty ratio is r = 1; otherwise r < 1.
Definition 2.1 (Uncheatable Grid Computing) Let P r(r)
be the probability that a participant with honesty ratio r
can cheat without being detected by the supervisor. Let
Ccheating be the expected cost of successful cheating, and
Ctask be the overall computation cost of the required task.
We say a grid computing is uncheatable if one of the following or both inequalities are true:

or

Φ(R) is used as the commitment

B: Φ(B) = hash(Φ(L3 )||Φ(L4 ))

P r(r) < ε, for a given ε(0 < ε ≤ 1)
Ccheating > Ctask .

3. The Commitment-Based Sampling Scheme
The naive sampling scheme can solve the uncheatable
grid computing problem with efficient computation cost, but
it requires expensive O(n) communication cost. To each
participant, this cost might not be too high, but to the supervisor, the cost might be overwhelming. For example, if
the task of grid computing is to break a 64-bit password using the brute force method, the total communication cost at
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3.1. The Commitment-Based Sampling Scheme

We demonstrate how the verification works using an example depicted in Fig. 1. Assume that x3 is selected as an
sample, whose corresponding leaf node in the tree is L3 .
The participant finds the path from L3 to the root (depicted
by the double lines). Then the participant sends to the supervisor f (x3 ) and all the Φ values of the sibling nodes (L4 , A,
D, and F ) along the path. The sibling nodes are depicted by
the black nodes in the figure. To verify whether, before committing Φ(R), the participant has computed f (x3 ) or not,
the supervisor first makes sure f (x3 ) is correct. Then the supervisor reconstructs the root R′ from f (x3 ), Φ(L4 ), Φ(A),
Φ(D), and Φ(F ).1 If Φ(R′ ) = Φ(R), we can say that the
participant knows f (x3 ) before building the Merkle tree.
We call the scheme described above the CommitmentBased Sampling (CBS) scheme. Its steps are described in
the following:

The Merkle tree (also called hash tree) is a complete binary tree equipped with a function hash and an assignment
Φ, which maps a set of nodes to a set of a fixed-size strings.
In a Merkle tree, the leaves of the tree contain the data, and
the Φ value of an internal tree node is the hash value of the
concatenation of the Φ values of its two children.
To build a Merkle tree for our problem, the participant
constructs n leaves L1 , . . . , Ln . Then it builds a complete
binary tree with these leaves. The Φ value of each node is
defined as the following (we use V to denote an internal tree
node, and Vlef t and Vright to denote V ’s two children):
Φ(Li )
Φ(V )

= f (xi ), for i = 1, . . . , n
= hash(Φ(Vlef t )||Φ(Vright )),

(1)

Step 1: Building Merkle Tree. Using Eq. (1), the participant builds a Merkle tree with leaf nodes L1 , . . . , Ln , and
Φ(Li ) = f (xi ), for i = 1, . . . , n. The participant then sends
Φ(R) to the supervisor.

where “||” represents the concatenation of two strings, and
the function hash is a one-way hash function such as MD5
or SHA. To make a commitment on all the data on the
leaves, the participant just needs to send Φ(R) to the supervisor, where R is the root of the Merkle tree. Fig. 1 depicts an example of the Merkle tree built for our purpose.
After receiving the commitment, the supervisor randomly selects a number of samples, and sends them to
the participant. The participant needs to provide the evidence to show that, before making the commitment, it has
already computed f for those samples. Let x be a sample, and L be x’s corresponding leaf node in the tree.
Let λ denote the path from L to the root (not including the root), and let H represent the length of the path.
In order to prove its honesty regarding f (x), the participant sends f (x) to the supervisor; in addition, for each node
v ∈ λ, the participant also sends Φ(v’s sibling) to the supervisor. We use λ1 , . . . , λH to represent these Φ values.
To verify the participant’s honesty on sample x, the supervisor first verifies the correctness of f (x). If f (x) sent by
the participant is incorrect, the participant is caught cheating immediately. Even if f (x) from the participant is correct, it cannot prove the participant’s honesty because the
participant, who did not compute f (x), can compute the
correct f (x) after knowing x is the sample. The supervisor
uses the commitment Φ(R) made by the participant to ensure that the correct f (x) is used at the time of building the
Merkle tree. To achieve this, the supervisor uses f (x) (correct) and λ1 , . . . , λH to reconstruct the root of the Merkle
tree R′ , thus getting Φ(R′ ). Only if Φ(R′ ) = Φ(R), will
the supervisor trust that the participant has correctly computed f (x) before building the Merkle tree. The communication cost of this process is proportional to the height of
the tree. Because the Merkle tree is a complete binary tree
with n leaves, its height is O(log n), where n = |D|.

Step 2: Sample Selection. The supervisor randomly generates m numbers (i1 , . . ., im ) in domain [1, n], and sends
these m numbers to the participant. These numbers are the
sample inputs.
Step 3: Participant’s Proof of Honesty. For each i ∈
{i1 , . . . , im }, the participant finds the path λ from the leaf
node Li to the root R; then for each node v ∈ λ, the participant sends to the supervisor Φ(v’s sibling). These Φ values are denoted by λ1 , . . . , λH . The participant also sends
f (xi ) to the supervisor.
Step 4: Supervisor’s Verification. For each
i ∈ {i1 , . . . , im }, the supervisor verifies whether f (xi )
from the participant is correct.
1. If f (xi ) is incorrect, the verification stops and the participant is caught cheating.
2. If f (xi ) is correct, using the recursive procedure defined in Eq. (1), the supervisor reconstructs the root
Φ(R′ ) of the hash tree from f (xi ) and λ1 , . . . , λH . If
Φ(R) 6= Φ(R′ ), the verification stops and the participant is caught cheating. If Φ(R) = Φ(R′ ), the verification succeeds for the sample i.
If the above verification succeeds for all
i ∈ {i1 , . . . , im }, the supervisor is convinced that,
with high probability, the participant has not cheated.
1
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The reconstruction of R′ can be conducted using the following procedure: with f (x3 ) and Φ(L4 ), we can compute Φ(B); then with
Φ(A), we can compute Φ(C); then with Φ(D), we can compute
Φ(E); finally we compute Φ(R′ ) from Φ(E) and Φ(F ).

To verify whether f (xi ) is correct does not necessarily
mean that the supervisor has to re-compute f (xi ). There are
many computations whose verification is much less expensive than the computations themselves. For example, factoring large numbers is an expensive computation, but verifying the factoring results is trivial.
Regarding the communication cost, for each sample, the
participant needs to send O(log n) data to the supervisor.
Therefore, the total communication overhead for m samples is O(m log n).

If the participant is dishonest and Φ(L) 6= f (x), to cheat
successfully, the participant must find λ′1 , . . . , λ′H , such that
Λ(f (x), λ′1 , . . . , λ′H )
= Λ(Φ(L), λ1 , . . . , λH ) = Φ(R).
Because Λ consists of a series of one-way hash functions, given Φ(R), when Φ(L) 6= f (x), it is computationally infeasible to find λ′1 , . . . , λ′H to satisfy the above equation. This proves that it is computationally infeasible for
the dishonest participant to convince the supervisor that it
knows f (x) at the time of building the Merkle tree.

3.2. Security Analysis
In the following theorem, let q be the probability that
the participant can guess the correct result of f (x), i.e.,
P rguess (Φ(L) = f (x)) = q. Let D′ be the set of inputs
that are computed honestly by the participant, so honesty
′
|
ratio is r = |D
|D| .

In the following theorem, we use L to denote the input
x’s corresponding leaf node. We use T to denote the Merkle
tree built by the participant, and we use R to denote the root
of the tree.
Let λ be the path from the leaf L to the root R, and
let λ1 , . . . , λH represent the Φ values of the sibling nodes
along the path λ. According to the property of the Merkle
tree, Φ(R) can be computed using Φ(L) and λ1 , . . . , λH .
We use Λ(Φ(L), λ1 , . . . , λH ) = Φ(R) to represent this calculation, where Φ(R) is already committed to the supervisor by the participant.

Theorem 3 When m samples are used in the CBS scheme,
The probability that a participant with honesty ratio r can
cheat successfully is
P r(cheating succeeds) = (r + (1 − r)q)m .

(2)

Proof. Since each sample is uniformly-randomly selected,
the probability that a sample x belongs to D′ is r. When
x ∈ D′ , i.e., the participant has indeed computed f (x),
according to Theorem 1, the participant should be able to
convince the supervisor of its honesty on sample x. When
x ∈ D−D′ , i.e., the participant did not compute f (x) when
building the tree, according to Theorem 2, it is computationally infeasible for the participant to cheat unless Φ(L) happens to equal f (x). Since P rguess (Φ(L) = f (x)) = q,
when x ∈ D − D′ , the probability to cheat successfully is
q.
Combining both cases of x ∈ D′ and x ∈ D − D′ , for
one sample x, the probability that the participant can prove
its honesty on sample x is (r + (1 − r)q). Therefore, the
probability that the participant can prove its honesty on all
m samples is (r + (1 − r)q)m .

Theorem 1 (Soundness). If the participant indeed has
computed f (x) at the time of building the Merkle tree, it
should succeed in proving its honesty on x.
Proof. If the participant is indeed honest, according to
the CBS scheme, when building the Merkle tree, we have
Φ(L) = f (x). Therefore, during the verification, the supervisor gets
Φ(R′ ) = Λ(f (x), λ1 , . . . , λH )
= Λ(Φ(L), λ1 , . . . , λH )
= Φ(R).
Therefore, according to the CBS scheme, the participant
succeeds in proving its honesty on x.

To keep the probability of successful cheating below a
small threshold ε, the sample size m should be

Theorem 2 (Uncheatability). If the participant is dishonest
on f (x), i.e., when building the Merkle tree, Φ(L) 6= f (x).
Using the CBS scheme, it is computationally infeasible for
the participant to convince the supervisor that it knows f (x)
when building the Merkle tree.

m≥

log ε
.
log (r + (1 − r)q)

(3)

Fig. 2 shows how large m should be for different honesty
ratios r, given ε = 0.0001. For example, let us consider a
situation where the participant has conducted only one half
of the task, which means only one half of the leaf nodes in
the Merkle tree contain the actually computed results, and
the other half contain guessed results. When the probability
of guessing the correct results is 0.5 (i.e., q = 0.5), we need

Proof. According to the CBS scheme, the participant sends f (x) and λ′1 , . . . , λ′H to the supervisor. After verifying the correctness of f (x), the supervisor uses
Φ(R′ ) = Λ(f (x), λ′1 , . . . , λ′H ) to reconstruct the root (denoted by R′ ) of the tree. The supervisor believes that the
participant is honest on f (x) only if Φ(R′ ) = Φ(R).
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at least 33 samples to ensure the probability of successful
cheating to be below ε = 0.0001. When q ≈ 0 (i.e., it is almost impossible to make a correct guess on f (x) without
computing it), we only need 14 samples.
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puting those Φ values requires the rebuilding of the whole
subtree depicted in the shading area. The cost of the rebuilding is O(2ℓ ), an increase of 2ℓ folds compared to the CBS
scheme.
We use the relative computation overhead (rco) to indicate how the O(2ℓ ) computation overhead impacts the entire task. The rco is defined as the ratio of the total computation overhead for m samples to the cost of computing
f (x) for all inputs in D. Let fc represent the cost of computing f (x) for one input. Let S = 2H−ℓ+1 represent the
amount of space for storing the partial tree. To rebuild one
subtree of height ℓ, we need to compute f functions for 2ℓ
inputs. If we ignore the cost of hash function, the cost of rebuilding a subtree equals computing f for 2ℓ times. Hence
we have the following formula:

3.3. Storage Usage Improvement
It should be noted that the CBS scheme requires the participant to store the entire Merkle tree in its memory or harddisk, and the amount of space required is O(|D|). Today’s
hard-disk technologies make it possible for a participant to
accept tasks with |D| as large as 230 (by using gig-bytes of
storage); however, storage becomes a problem when |D| is
much larger than 230 .
We noticed that if a task is as large as 240 , then computing f (x) must be very fast; otherwise it might take the participant unreasonablely long time to finish the task. So we
can make a tradeoff between time and storage in the following way: Assume the height of the entire Merkle tree is
H = log |D|, and the root is at level 0. Instead of storing
the entire Merkle tree, the participant only stores the tree up
to level H − ℓ, where 0 < ℓ < H. Fig. 3(a) depicts the part
of the tree that needs to be stored. The total amount of stor), a decrease of 2ℓ folds.
age required is O( |D|
2ℓ
To prove that it has computed f (x) (in Step 3 of the CBS
scheme), the participant must find the path from the sample x’s corresponding leaf node to the root, and then send to
the supervisor the Φ values of the sibling nodes along this
path. Unfortunately the sibling nodes in the lower part of the
tree cannot be obtained from the storage. The shading area
in Fig. 3(a) represents the subtree that contains the sample
x but not saved in the storage. Fig. 3(b) depicts an example of the unsaved subtree. From the figure, we can see that
nodes V1 , V2 , and V3 are also the sibling nodes along the
path, but their Φ values are not saved, but need to be recomputed. From Fig. 3(b), it is not difficult to see that recom-

rco =
=

m · 2ℓ
m · 2ℓ · fc
=
|D| · fc
2H
2m
m
=
.
S
2(H−ℓ)

The above equation indicates that rco is only affected
by m and S, not by the amount of inputs in D. The more
storage a participant uses for storing the tree, the lower
is the relative computation overhead. For example, when
m = 64, if we use 4G (232 ) hard disk space to store the
partial Merkle tree, we have rco = 2−25 . This means that,
regardless of how large a task is, compared to the cost of
the task, the computation overhead at the participant side
is negligible when we use 4G disk space. Therefore, even
for a task of size 240 , using 4G disk space provides a feasible solution both storage-wise and computation-wise.
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4. A Non-Interactive CBS Scheme

Step 2: Sample Selection. Let g be a one-way hash function. Assume D = {x1 , . . . , xn } is assigned to the participant. The participant uses the following method to generate
m numbers {i1 , . . . , im } in domain [1, n]:

The CBS scheme has an extra round of interaction between the supervisor and the participant. This interaction involves the participant’s sending the commitment and the supervisor’s sending the samples. The interaction ensures that
the supervisor sends the samples only after it receives the
commitment. Although the communication cost of this extra round of interaction is not a concern, the interaction is
often found less appealing because of the implementation
issues involved in grid computing.
In many grid computing architectures, the supervisor
might not be able to directly interact with the participants.
For example, in the GRACE (Grid Architecture for Computational Economy) architecture [6], which represents a
futuristic paradigm of a service oriented computing industry, there exists a Grid Resource Broker (GRB), which acts
as a mediator between the supervisor and the participant.
The GRB is responsible for finding more resources (participants) and scheduling of tasks among the resources depending on their availability and capability.
In the GRACE architecture, the supervisor assigns a big
bulk of tasks to GRB, and relies on GRB to interact with
and assign tasks to the participants. The supervisor does not
even know which participant is conducting what tasks. If
the supervisor wants to verify the participant’s honesty on
its own using the CBS scheme, it will be difficult because
GRB hides the participants from the supervisor.
One way to get rid of this extra round of interaction is to
let the participant generate the sample choices. Obviously,
if the participant is to select the samples, the sample selection must satisfy the following properties:

ik = (g k (Φ(R)) mod n) + 1,

f or k = 1 . . . m

(4)

where
g k (Φ(R)) =



g(Φ(R)),
g(g k−1 (Φ(R))),

for k = 1
for k = 2 . . . m

Inputs xi , for i ∈ {i1 , . . . , im }, are the selected samples.
In other words, the kth sample is the result of applying the
one-way hash function g on R for k times.
Step 3: Participant’s Proof of Honesty. This step is also
exactly like the CBS scheme.
Step 4: Supervisor’s Verification. Using Eq. (4), the supervisor regenerates the sample choices {i1 , . . . , im } from
Φ(R). It then uses the Step 4 of the CBS scheme to verify the participant’s results.

4.2. Security Analysis
Assume the participant has conducted the computations
only for the inputs in D′ , where D′ ⊂ D, and the honesty
′
|
ratio is r = |D
|D| < 1. Also assume that the sample choices
generated by the participant are S1 , . . . , Sm . The only way
that the participant can cheat successfully is to make sure
that all the Si for i = 1 . . . m fall into D′ .2
Assuming the perfect randomness of the one-way hash
values, the probability that all these m sample choices are in
the set of D′ is rm . Namely when building the Merkle tree,
the participant can use whatever values to replace f (x) for
x ∈ D − D′ , the probability to produce the sample choices
that are all in set D′ is rm .
The one-way hash function acts as an unbiased randombit generator for the sample generation. There is no way for
the participant to force the one-way function to produce certain values or to guess which values it will produce. It is also
computationally infeasible for the participant to work in the
reverse way, i.e., the participant cannot select the samples
first, and then build a Merkle tree that generates these selected samples.
Unfortunately, the non-interactive feature brings up a
potential attack. In the CBS scheme, the participant has
only one chance to cheat. For m = 10 and r = 0.5;
Pr(successfull cheating) = 1 in 210 . If one cheating attempt fails, the supervisor will not give the participant more
chances to cheat. The probability of 1 in 210 tends to be

1. The samples are selected after the Merkle tree is built.
2. The samples must be hard to predict.
When the supervisor selects the samples, the above two
requirements are easily enforced because the supervisor
does not tell the participant the sample choices until the participant sends the commitment. How can we enforce these
requirements when we rely on the participant to generate
the sample choices?

4.1. A Non-Interactive CBS Scheme
We modified the CBS scheme, so that the sample choices
are generated by the participant. We call this improved
scheme the Non-Interactive CBS (NI-CBS) scheme. Due to
the page limit, we will not repeat the steps that are the same
as in the CBS scheme.
Step 1: Building Merkle Tree. This step is exactly like the
CBS scheme. At the end, the participant sends Φ(R) to the
supervisor.
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We assume that the probability that the participant can guess the correct computation results without conducting the computation is negligible, i.e., q ≈ 0.

5. Conclusion and Future Work

small enough for the interactive scheme, but it is still too
large for the non-interactive scheme. The participant can use
the following strategy to cheat:

We present a scheme to prevent cheating in Grid computing. Our Scheme uses a Commitment-Based Sampling
(CBS) technique to detect whether the participant is cheating or not. Unlike the old schemes [8, 10], CBS handles
generic computations gracefully. To prevent the participant
from changing the computation results after learning the
samples, the CBS scheme uses the Merkle tree for the participant to commit its results before learning the sample selections. The CBS scheme can be used for generic computations in grid computing. It is efficient in communication as
well as in computation. Based on the CBS scheme, we have
addressed two important issues (1) how to reduce the storage requirement, and (2) how to convert the CBS scheme
from an interactive scheme to a non-interactive scheme.
One assumption made in the CBS scheme scheme is
that |D| should be significantly large. When each participant is assigned a task with very few inputs, the sampling
scheme does not work well. For example, when |D| = 1,
i.e., each task consists of only one input, the cost of verifying a sample (for the CBS scheme) is as expensive as conducting the task. Therefore, the scheme is no better than the
naive double-check-every-result scheme. Developing efficient schemes for a situation when |D| is small is a challenging open problem that we plan to pursue.

1. Build the Merkle tree, using random numbers as the
results of f (x) for the inputs x that are not in D′ (i.e.,
x ∈ D − D′ ).
2. Compute the sample selections from the root of the
Merkle tree. If they are all within D′ , cheating is successful; otherwise pick other random numbers as f (x)
for x ∈ D − D′ .
3. Revise the Merkle tree based on the newly selected values, and repeat step (2) until the cheating becomes successful.
The participant can use the above strategy to repeatedly
make many cheating attempts until it finds out that all the
m generated samples are in D′ . Since the process is noninteractive, the supervisor knows nothing about these attempts.
There are two ways to defeat this strategy: one way is to
increase the number of samples. For example, we can use
128 samples, because making 2128 attempts is a computationally infeasible task. However, this also increases the
computation cost for the verification at the supervisor side,
because the supervisor now has to verify 128 computations,
much more than it needs to do in the CBS scheme.
Another way to defeat the cheating strategy is to let the
participant pay for all those cheating attempts. If the cost of
conducting the cheating becomes more expensive than the
cost of conducting all the required computations (i.e. computing f (x) for all x ∈ D), the cheating brings no benefit. To achieve this, we increase the cost of sample generation. Let Cg be the cost of the one-way function g, and Cf
be the cost of function f . Because the probability that each
attempt being successful is rm , the expected number of attempts the participant needs to make is r1m . Therefore, to
make the expected cost of the total cheating attempts more
expensive than the total cost of the task, we need the following inequality:
1
· m · Cg ≥ n · Cf .
(5)
rm
To achieve the above inequality without increasing m,
we can increase Cg . Most of the one-way functions, such
as MD5, are very fast. To find a one-way function g such
that Cg satisfies the above inequality, we just need to let
g ≡ (M D5)k , namely applying MD5 for k times, where k
is a number that makes Cg expensive enough. If we let the
left side of the inequality just a slightly greater than the right
side, this extra cost of g does not bring significant overhead
to the supervisor or the honest participant because the ratio between the cost of sample generation (m · Cg ) and the
cost of the entire task (n·Cf ) is about rm , which can be significantly small when we choose proper values for m.
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